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LOBBYING DISCLOSURE: A RECIPE FOR REFORM
William V.Luneburg*
Thomas M Susman**

I. INTRODUCTION

Regulation or disclosure? Which combination of ingredients is most likely to be
effective in addressing the ills afflicting the body politic? Not surprisingly, this
perennial debate has no clear-cut winner since both approaches, sometimes working in
tandem, have proved their merit in a variety of contexts. Predictably, they were both
embraced by the proposals advanced in the 109th Congress to deal with the most recent
round of lobbying scandals commonly associated with Jack Abramoff and former
House Majority Leader Tom DeLay.
Numerous statutory and congressional rule changes were proposed to restrict the
opportunities for lobbyists to gain special access to and favors for their clients from
Senators and Representatives. These included provisions barring former Membersturned-lobbyists from using congressional exercise facilities, prohibiting lobbyists from
arranging trips for legislators, and extending the "cooling-off' period during which
former Members cannot engage in lobbying. There were also calls for significant
additions to the disclosure obligations currently imposed on lobbyists. These additions
would extend to, for instance, the campaign fundraising routinely conducted by
lobbyists for Members and the activities by lobbyists and their public relations firms to
encourage the public to contact Congress on specific legislative matters (grassroots
lobbying). Indeed, the bills that garnered the most attention and found leadership
support in both Houses contained, in varying degrees, both new regulatory measures
and mandates for more disclosure of lobbying activities and the lobbyist-legislator
linkage. I
The debate on lobbying reform reached a fever pitch in January 2006 following
Abramoff's guilty pleas to charges of fraud, tax evasion and conspiracy to bribe public
officials. Unfortunately, that intensity of congressional interest was not sustained.
Although both the House and Senate ultimately adopted "reform bills," 2 both fell far
Mr. Luneburg is Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. He is co-editor of
THE
LOBBYING MANUAL: A COMPLETE GUIDE To FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS AND LOBBYISTS (3d ed.

2005) [hereinafter THE LOBBYING MANUAL].
.. Mr. Susman is a partner in the Washington office of Ropes & Gray LLP and coordinates the firm's
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1. See S. 2349, 109th Cong. (2006) (as passed in the Senate on March 29, 2006 by a vote of 90-8); H.R.
4975, 109th Cong. (2006) (which passed in the House on May 3, 2006 by a vote of 217-213). It should
surprise no one that many of the "fixes" proposed in these and other bills bore absolutely no relationship to
the problems raised by the corruption scandals that prompted their introduction.
2. Id.
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short of what some had hoped for and others feared. Proponents, as well as opponents,
of significant reform could, therefore, derive some solace from the fact that ultimately
the 109th Congress was unable to forge a compromise bill. The most aggressive
advocates for change, such as Public Citizen, 3 made it clear that, in their view, lobbyist
and legislator misbehavior had reached the point where regulation rather than disclosure
should be the principal focus for legislative change. Yet, this point of view was largely
ignored by the House leadership in forcing a party-line vote in May 2006 on its much
watered-down lobbying bill.
While regulation might well play a crucial role in the lobbying area, the
effectiveness of lobbying disclosure as a mechanism to prevent serious abuses and
inappropriate behavior has never been adequately tested. However, its use for those
prophylactic purposes is routinely invoked during legislative debates with obligatory
references to Justice Brandeis's famous aphorism on the "disinfectant" value of
"sunlight." 4 The first generally applicable federal lobbying disclosure statute, the badly
drafted Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 ("FRLA"), was a disaster. Where
complied with-which was rare-the legislation produced reams of irrelevant
documentation (such as cab fares, phone bills, and messenger fees) that disguised,
rather than revealed, the nature of lobbying efforts. The Act was ignored by the only
agency with power to enforce it (the Department of Justice ("DOJ")) following the
Supreme Court's narrowing construction in 1954.5
Half a century later, when the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 ("LDA") 6 replaced
the FRLA after a bipartisan effort in the House and Senate, there was renewed hope that
"sunlight" might work its beneficial effects. While the congressional "findings"
underlying the LDA do not expressly refer to deterrence of illegal or otherwise
improper behavior, that goal clearly served as an important subtext for the statutory
references to the need for "public awareness of the efforts of paid lobbyists to influence
the public decision-making process," and the expected increase in "public confidence in
the integrity of Government." 7 However, although LDA-mandated disclosure can, if
conscientiously provided, offer a general picture of the scope and focus of lobbying
campaigns directed at not just Congress but the executive branch, that "freeze-frame"
photo 1) omits crucial components of lobbying campaigns, such as grassroots efforts
and the lobbyist-candidate nexus; 2) seriously blurs or even misrepresents important
aspects of the lobbying that is covered by the Act; and 3) is not easily or fully accessible
to interested members of the public and press. As if these factors do not suffice to
undercut seriously the effectiveness of the LDA in achieving its purposes, the
Department of Justice appears to devote only token resources to enforcement of the Act.
Moreover, the DOJ's efforts in punishing noncompliance are remarkable not simply for
their infrequency, but also for their lack of transparency. Only if the LDA is amended

3. See, e.g., Public Citizen, Proposed Reforms Regarding the Disclosure and Regulation of Federal
Lobbying, available at http://www.cleanupwashington.org/lobbying/page.cfm?pageid-46 (last visited Dec.
15, 2006).
4. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (National Home Library Foundation ed., 1933).
5. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954). See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Federal Lobbying
Regulation: History Through 1954, THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note *, 11-14.
6. 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).
7. Id.
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to deal effectively with these shortcomings can lobbying disclosure be fairly evaluated
as an alternative to more prescriptive regulation for preventing illegal or inappropriate
lobbying practices and otherwise contributing to the integrity of government.
Since 1995, the frequent reliance by the news media on LDA records identifying
the most profitable of active lobbying firms and the issues on which they focus their
efforts has provided tantalizing evidence of the potential value of additional mandatory
disclosure. A story appearing in USA Today in February 2006 highlighted the ability of
LDA filings to spotlight (or at least created a basis for further exploration of) possible
abuse or inappropriate behavior. The article suggested that Senator Arlen Specter or his
staff had arranged for millions of dollars of "earmarks" for Pennsylvania firms
represented by a lobbying firm headed by the husband of one of the Senator's staff.8
LDA reports filed by the firm listing the husband as the lobbyist for particular projects
were apparently crucial in directing attention to Specter's office. 9 The lobbyist denied
contacting the Senator's office with regard to the earmarks at issue, and while the
Senator did not believe that any law or ethics rule had been violated, the matter was
referred to the Senate Ethics Committee for review. Ironically, if the LDA had required
more specific information-for example, not just the listing of lobbyists and specific
issues lobbied, but which Senator's office had been contacted specifically as part of a
lobbying campaign-allegations of a conflict of interest in this case could have
potentially been countered more easily.
In light of the various burdens imposed by disclosure schemes, including not only
the time and expense necessary to maintain records and to complete and file required
forms, but also the potential chilling of the First Amendment rights of free speech and
petition, we confront at the outset one likely objection. More detailed disclosure may
not have an audience with the ability or willingness to sort through the information
provided, make crucial linkages, and formulate insightful conclusions. A similar
dilemma confronts voters in both issue and candidate elections who need informative
"clues," rather than volumes of information they lack time to find and absorb, in order
10
to vote intelligently on their preferences.
Fortunately, aside from improved accessibility to lobbying information that can be
provided by the governmental entities responsible for its collection, much of the work
of distilling and linking can be achieved (as it has been in the past) by various watchdog
groups. In particular, The Center for Public Integrity, self-described as a "nonpartisan,
non-advocacy, independent journalism organization," has aggressively captured
information contained in registration and report forms filed under the LDA, and then
published that information in an Internet-accessible database, allowing searches that
easily reveal important aspects of federal lobbying activity.
The application of more
advanced search capabilities to an expanded database of information will offer the press
and public access to a much more detailed picture of lobbying Congress and the

8. See Matt Kelley, Firm's Clients Benefiting From Conracts, USA TODAY, Feb. 15, 2006, at A2,

available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-02-15-specter-inside_x.htm.
9. Maeve Reston, Specter Denies Lobbying Charge,PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 17, 2006, at A 1,

9.
10. Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled PoliticalActors and Campaign Disclosure Laws in
Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L. J. 295, 296 (2005).
11. LobbyWatch, The Center For Public Integrity, http://www.publicintegrity.orglabout.aspx?act-mission.
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executive branch with just a few clicks.
Accordingly, if the Lobbying Disclosure Act is to achieve its potential for
identifying and, in the process, deterring illegal, abusive, questionable, and otherwise
inappropriate conduct by federal decisionmakers, improving and implementing the
statute requires some additional ingredients. After outlining the general framework of
First Amendment constraints that must be taken into account in crafting a lobbying
disclosure scheme and then briefly describing the LDA as it currently exists, we
summarize proposals for reform that might provide a focus for debate during future
legislative deliberations on needed changes to the LDA. 12
Indeed, from all
appearances, the incoming leadership of the 10th Congress appears
to
be serious about
13
agenda.
its
on
items
first
the
of
one
as
reform
lobbying
up
taking
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
The First Amendment right "to petition the government for a redress of
grievances" 14 constrains laws or regulations that impact the attempt to communicate
with legislators, their staff, and executive branch officials seeking official action. The
Supreme Court has noted that the right to petition is one of "the most precious of the
liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights,' ' 15 one that is implicit in "[t]he very idea of a
government, republican in form." 16 While the Court has only occasionally treated it
separately from freedom of speech, one of the more noteworthy examples involved
lobbying by railroad and trucking companies against each other, including grassroots
efforts to influence the public. 17 In construing the Sherman Act as inapplicable to these
activities, the Court relied in part on the right to petition, though it failed to illuminate
the scope of the distinctive nature (if any) of the protection afforded by that right.
To date, the Court has been called upon only once to determine whether federal
lobbying legislation violated the First Amendment. United States v. Harriss involved
a challenge to the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, which mandated
disclosure subject to criminal penalties. Invoking the freedoms of speech and press and
the right to petition without differentiation, 19 the Court narrowly construed the statute to
apply only to persons whose "main" work was lobbying in the sense of "direct"

12. There are, to be sure, other useful reforms that would help curb some of the corrupting tendencies in
the world of legislation and lobbying. See, e.g., Thomas M. Susman, Reciprocity Underlies Lobbying
Scandals,
THE
HILL,
June
28,
2006,
available
at
http://www.hillnews.com/thehill/export/TheHill/Comment/oped/O62806-opedl.html.
Those are, for today,
beyond the scope of our paper.
13. CENTER FOR MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY, 110th Congress/Democratic Party Agenda, available at
http://www.sourcewatch.org/skins/common/images/CP-left-art.jpg (last visited Dec. 15, 2006).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
16. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876).
17. E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961). The Court most
recently discussed the line of cases originating in Noerr in BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516
(2002) (holding that employer's unsuccessful retaliatory lawsuit against unions could not serve as a basis for

unfair labor practice liability, absent finding that the suit was objectively baseless).
18. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
19. Id. at 625.
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21
Noting that Congress had not prohibited lobbying,
communication with Congress.
though accepting that persons might refrain from lobbying based on fears that they
could be prosecuted for violation of 23
the statute, 22 the Court found that the statute was
interest."
national
"vital
a
by
justified
Present-day legislative complexities are such that individual members of Congress
cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to which they are regularly
subjected. Yet full realization of the American ideal of government by elected
representatives depends to no small extent on their ability to properly evaluate such
pressures. Otherwise the voice of the people may all too easily be drowned out by the
voice of special interest groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as
proponents of the public weal. 24
Interestingly, this rationale was not invoked by Congress in adopting the LDA in
1995. The expressly stated "finding" supporting the statute was the need to increase not
25
congressional information, but rather public awareness, regarding lobbying pressures.
More specifically, in reporting an earlier version of the bill that was ultimately enacted,
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs noted that:
[t]he purposes of lobbying disclosure include increasing public awareness of and
confidence in the functioning of government; ensuring that public officials are fully
accountable to the public for their actions; discouraging lobbyists and their clients from
engaging in improper activities; and affording interested parties an opportunity to
26
respond to lobbying campaigns.
This last-listed purpose reflects the more general goal of deterring officials from
being "overly compliant" to certain lobbying interests. Because of information made
available to interested parties, there will be circumstances where officials will be at a
loss to explain their official action, since their chosen rationale or justification is
undercut by the increased disclosure.
Aside from the LDA itself, Congress and the federal courts have viewed "sunlight"
as a necessary precondition to good government in a variety of contexts. For example,
Congress has forbidden ex parte communications in formal rulemakings and
27
adjudications;
at least one court has done the same with respect to informal
• 28
rulemakings.
Congress has also mandated that deliberations of various federal
29
agencies and federal advisory committees be open to the public except in certain
circumstances (which exceptions, by the way, do not encompass typical lobbying
communications 31). Like the LDA, these restrictions all directly or indirectly impact

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
or more
30.
31.

Id. at 623.
Id. at 625.
Id. at 626.
347 U.S. 612, 625.
Id. at 626.
See supratext accompanying note 7.
S.REP. No. 103-37, at 23 (1993).
5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1) (2000).
Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 53-59 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(a)(1) (2000) (applicable to agencies headed by a "collegial body" composed of two
individuals).
Id. app. § 10(a)(1).
Id. § 552b(c) app. § 10(d).
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the right to petition. Not surprisingly, the rationales for this mandated openness
correspond nicely with some of those invoked in support of the LDA: "to prevent the
appearance of impropriety" and to allow interested persons to "respond effectively and
'32
ensure that [their] position is fairly considered."
Based on existing case law, it is impossible to know whether the right to petition
plays a distinctive role in protecting the ability of persons outside the government to
communicate with Congress or the executive branch in the attempt to influence their
decision-making. However, given the "exacting scrutiny" applied to laws that might
burden the freedoms of speech and press 33 and the fact that a "petition" for redress of
grievances is simply one form of speech, it is difficult to believe that the analysis
applied would today significantly differ from the Court's free speech jurisprudence,
even if the Court were to treat the right to petition separately in dealing with the
constitutionality of lobbying disclosure law. With regard to the freedoms of speech and
press, the Court has noted that:
[d]iscussion of public issues... are [sic] integral to the operation of the system of
government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest
protection to such political expression in order 'to assure [the] unfettered interchange of
34
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.
Whether the exchange of ideas occurs near or far from the center of governmental
decision-making, in a public square during an anti-war demonstration, or in the quiet of
a Senator's office before floor debate on a defense appropriation bill, the freedom of
speech equally applies, as the Harrisscase itself accepts.
Since the Supreme Court decided Harriss,issues related to the constitutionality of
mandatory disclosure have most commonly arisen in the context of the broader public
debate that occurs far from the Beltway. In 1976, the Court considered First
Amendment challenges to federal election finance law requiring disclosure of the
identities of persons and entities contributing money to help elect candidates for federal
office. In Buckley v. Valeo 35• (whose
analysis was reaffirmed in 2003 by McConnell v.
• 36
Federal Election Commission ), the Court held that disclosure was justified by a
variety of interests, two of which essentially formed the rationale for enactment of the
LDA: improving the ability of the electorate to hold public officials accountable and
37
deterring inappropriate or illegal quidpro quos.
First, disclosure provides the electorate with information 'as to where political
campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate' in order to aid the
voters in evaluating those who seek federal office. It allows voters to place each
candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the
basis of party labels and campaign speeches. The sources of a candidate's financial
support also alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be
responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in office.
32. See, e.g., Prof'l Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. FLRA, 685 F.2d 547, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
33. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 64 (1976).
34. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
35. Id. at 1 (per curiam).

36. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
37. 2 U.S.C. § 1601(1), (3) (2000). See supra text accompanying note 7.
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Second, disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance
of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity.
This exposure may discourage those who would use money for improper purposes
either before or after the election. A public armed with information about a candidate's
most generous supporters is better able to detect any post-election special favors that
38
may be given in return.
In upholding a ban on national political parties' involvement with "soft money,"
the Court later noted in McConnell that its understanding of "corruption" and its
"appearance" extended beyond the obvious case of bribery to where the officeholder
was simply "too compliant" to the wishes of those who contributed large sums to his or
39
her election.
In the years interveningS40between Buckley and McConnell, the Court in Mclntyre v.
Ohio Elections Commission struck down on First Amendment grounds an Ohio law
prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign literature. The leaflet in question
opposed a local ballot measure for a school tax levy. In distinguishing the disclosure
requirements involved in Buckley, the Court noted:
Though such mandatory reporting [in Buckley] undeniably impedes protected First
Amendment activity, the intrusion is a far cry from compelled self-identification on all
election-related writings. A written election-related document-particularly a leafletis often a personally crafted statement of a political viewpoint. Mrs. McIntyre's
handbills surely fit that description. As such, identification of the author against her will
is particularly intrusive; it reveals unmistakably the content of her thoughts on a
controversial issue. Disclosure of an expenditure and its use, without more, reveals far
less information. It may be information that a person prefers to keep secret, and
undoubtedly it often gives away something about the spender's political views.
Nonetheless, even though money may 'talk,' its speech is less specific, less personal,
and less provocative than a handbill-and as a result, when money supports an
41
unpopular viewpoint it is less likely to precipitate retaliation.
Not only was the state requirement more intrusive than the disclosure requirements
upheld in Buckley, but the governmental interest implicated was different: to avoid
corruption and the appearance of corruption, in the McConnell
sense of public officials'
•
42
being overly responsive to the wishes of large contributors.
At this point in the
opinion, the Court retrospectively explained its decision upholding the FRLA in United
States v. Harriss as based, at least in part, on the same rationale: "The activities of
lobbyists who have direct access to elected representatives, if undisclosed, may well
present the appearance of corruption." 43 However, it also cited Harriss for the
proposition that, at least in some contexts-though not in McIntyre itself -disclosure

38. 424 U.S. at 66-67.
39. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389

(2000)).
40. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
41. Id.at 355.
42. Id. at 356. "Disclosure of expenditures lessens the risk that individuals will spend money to support a
candidate as a quidpro quo for special treatment after the candidate is in office." Id.
43. Id. at 356 n.20.
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44
of the identities of sources was important in evaluating the arguments they make.
The "marketplace of ideas"'45 may in most instances be best served by a "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open. ''46 Mandatory disclosure of lobbying pressures fits well with this
concept by insuring that most relevant information will be available to the public,
the executive branch for their consideration in making and
Members of Congress, and 47
policy.
public
implementing
But too much "sunlight" can have undesirable effects. 48 In 1958, the Court struck
down the attempt by a state court to order disclosure of membership lists of a private
association without a showing of a "controlling justification" for such disclosure. That
case, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,49 involved "an uncontroverted showing
that on past occasions revelation of the identity of [the NAACP's] rank-and-file
members [had] exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat
of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility."' 50 Justice Harlan's
opinion for the Court noted that advocacy of public and private beliefs, particularly
controversial ones, was enhanced by a person's association with others. 51 In that sense,
the freedoms of speech and assembly were inextricably related; 52 compelled disclosure
could deter the willingness of some or many people to associate for advancement of
their beliefs because of the personal consequences of that exposure. 53 In short, privacy
of association was necessary to insure the ability to associate for the advancement of
beliefs.
This concern that mandatory disclosure may, in some instances, be antithetical to
"the marketplace of ideas" was later reiterated in Buckley. 54 Buckley, however, limited
the protection of NAACP to cases where evidence showed a "reasonable probability that
the compelled disclosure of a party's contributor's names will subject them to threats,
harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties." 55 As the
quotation from the McIntyre opinion indicates, 56 it was the potential for harassment of
the individual distributing the anonymous election leaflet that figured prominently in
the Court's invalidation of the disclosure requirements in that case.57

44. Id. at 354 n.18.
45. 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995).
46. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
47. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 197 (noting the First Amendment values served by disclosure of,
for example, the members of misleadingly named coalitions).
48. For an examination of some aspects of the relationship between freedom of speech and
nondisclosure, see William V. Luneburg, Civic Republicanism, The First Amendment, and Executive Branch
Policymaking,43 ADM[. L. REV. 367, 379, 380-89 (1991).
49. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 462.
Id. at 460.
Id.
Id. at 462-63.

54. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976).

55. Id. at 74. That showing was made in Brown v. Socialist Workers' 74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio),
459 U.S. 87 (1982), where the Court found that disclosures required by Ohio's campaign finance law could
not constitutionally be applied to the Socialist Workers Party. McConnell later reiterated that limitation on
NAACP. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 197-99 (2003).
56. See text supra note 4 1.
57. In Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York v. Village of Stratton, the Court again emphasized
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FEDERAL LOBBYING DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

Disclosure under the LDA is required only if an individual is hired for
compensation to influence federal policy or its implementation 58 through
communications to Congress, its staff, its officers or employees, or to high-ranking
federal executive branch officials. 59 But occasional compensated legislative or
executive contacts do not necessarily require LDA compliance-even if those contacts
have significant impacts on decision-making. There are two specific requirements that
must be satisfied: there must be a "lobbyist" as defined by the Act, and a certain amount
of money must be earned from, or spent on "lobbying activities."
First, the person hired must spend at least twenty percent of his or her time during a
six month period engaged in "lobbying activities ' 6° for the client 61 and make more than
one "lobbying contact.
"Lobbying contact" is a statutorily defined term that includes
oral and written (including electronic) communications made to covered federal
officials regarding the full gamut of federal law-making and administration, 63 where
those communications do not fall within one of nineteen statutory exceptions. 64 While
there is no express exception for grassroots lobbying, the legislative history of the
statute makes crystal clear that Congress did not want it considered as either an LDA
"lobbying contact" or "lobbying activity." 65 If these criteria for coverage are satisfied,
the person hired is considered to be a "lobbyist" within the meaning of the Act.
That person may be employed as part of a firm that represents the interests of
individuals, public or private corporations, or other entities; or the lobbyist may be the
the need for anonymity for advocates of unpopular causes in finding that a permitting scheme was
unconstitutional. 536 U.S. 150, 167 (2002). Finally, the Court has acknowledged that the administrative
costs of disclosure may deter advocacy and raise First Amendment concerns. See FEC v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 254-55 (1986).
58. See 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(A) (1998). See also Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra
note *, for an exhaustive examination of the requirements of the LDA.
59. Id. § 1602(3)-(4). The officials include the President and Vice-President, officers and employees of
the Executive Office of the President, Levels I-V of the Executive (salary) Schedule, certain high officers in
the uniformed services, and Schedule C employees.
60. "Lobbying activities" include both "lobbying contacts" and efforts in support of such contacts (e.g.
preparation and planning activities). Id. § 1602(7).
61. In the case of an association or coalition, the "client" for disclosure purposes is the association or
coalition, not the individual members. Id. § 1602(2).
62. Id. § 1602(10).
63. Id. § 1602(8)(A) (including the formulation, modification, and adoption of federal legislation,
administrative rules, Executive orders, and "any other program, policy, or position of the United States
Government," the "administration or execution of a Federal program or policy," and appointments requiring
Senate confirmation).
64. See id. § 1602(8)(B). The exceptions include communications by state and local officials, speeches,
articles, administrative requests, communications made as part of federal advisory committee participation,
congressional testimony (whether subpoenaed or not), comments filed in rulemaking proceedings, petitions
for rulemaking or other administrative action, and protected whistleblower disclosures, to name a few. The
exceptions present a vast array of interpretative issues which, for "occasional" lobbyists, may make the need
for registration with regard to a particular client a matter of some doubt.
It should be noted, however, that even if one of these exceptions applies so that a particular communication is
not a "lobbying contact" (e.g. it involves congressional testimony), that communication, and the preparation
for it, may constitute "lobbying activity" that counts in determining whether a person is a "lobbyist" and
whether the applicable monetary threshold for registration is met. See William V. Luneburg & A.L. Spitzer,
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995: Scope of Coverage, THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supranote *,at 63.
65. Id., at 45-47.

2006]

Lobbying Disclosure:A Recipefor Reform

employee of an organization (the client, for LDA purposes) for which he or she
conducts lobbying activities. In any event, if that firm or self-lobbying organization
employs at least one lobbyist, it (not the lobbyist) must register with both the Clerk of
the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate. 66 However, registration
is necessary only ifthe income earned by the firm from lobbying activities for the client
(registration is client-by-client) is expected to exceed $6,000 during a six month period
or, alternatively, the expenditures for lobbying activities incurred by the67 self-lobbying
organization are expected to exceed $24,500 during a semiannual period.
The LDA offers an option to simplify record-keeping and reporting obligations of
taxable businesses and trade associations that may not deduct lobbying expenses for
income tax purposes, and of certain tax-exempt entities (basically public charities)
whose lobbying activities must be limited to avoid sanctions under the Internal Revenue
Code ("IRC"). These entities that lobby on their own behalf are permitted to calculate
their expenditures for lobbying using IRC definitions of that term in determining
whether the monetary threshold for registration is met.
However, if that election is
made, when it comes to determining if an employee is a lobbyist (a determination that is
also crucial to the need to register), the electing entities must use LDA definitions for
69
lobbying Congress, and IRC definitions for lobbying the federal executive branch.
Because of significant differences between IRC and LDA definitions, 70 opting for the
IRC calculation method may sometimes result in a determination that registration is not
necessary, where it would be required if LDA definitions were utilized.
If registration is required, certain basic information must be provided to the Clerk
and Secretary (Form LD-1), including the following: 1) the name and address of the
registrant and client; 2) the name and address of any "organization" (which does not
include individuals) other than the client that both contributes more than $10,000
toward the lobbying activities of the registrant in a semiannual period and, in whole or
major part, plans, supervises or controls those activities (this is known as an "affiliated
organization"); 71 3) the name and address
S •72 of foreign entities (which may include
individuals) having certain relationships
to the client or a disclosed affiliated
organization, the percentage of the foreign entities' equitable ownership (if any) in the
client and, if the foreign entity itself contributes more than $10,000 to the lobbying
activities of the registrant, the amount of such contribution; 4) the general and specific
issues as to which lobbying for the client has taken place or is expected; and 5) the

66. See 2 U.S.C. § 1603(a)(1)-(2) (1998).
67. See id. § 1603(a)(3). As required by the Act, the thresholds for registration were increased in January
1997, 2001, and, most recently, 2005 to take into account increases in the Consumer Price Index. Section

1603(a)(3)(B), requires such adjustments every four years. Id. § 1603(a)(3)(B).
68. Id.§§ 1610(a)(1), (b)(1).
69. Id. §§ 1610(a)(2), (b)(2).
70. For the best succinct, yet comprehensive, description of these differences and their impact, see U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL LOBBYING/DIFFERENCES IN LOBBYING DEFINITIONS AND THEIR

IMPACT GAO/GGD-99-38 (Apr. 1999) [hereinafter "GAO Study"].

71. 2 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3) (2000).
72. Disclosure of the foreign entity is required if it 1)holds at least twenty percent equitable ownership in
the client or any "affiliated organization;" 2) directly or indirectly, in whole or major part, plans, supervises,
controls, directs, finances, or subsidizes the activities of the client or any "affiliated organization;" or 3) is an
affiliate of the client or any "affiliated organization" and has a direct interest in the outcome of the lobbying
activity. Id. § 1603(b)(4).

Journalof Legislation

[Vol. 33:1

names of employees of the registrant who have acted or are expected to act as lobbyists
for the client, along with the identification of those employee-lobbyists that have, within
official. 73
two years, served in the position of a covered executive or legislative branch
Following registration, reports by registered lobbying firms and self-lobbying
organizations (Form LD-2) are required to be filed with the Clerk and Secretary to
cover semiannual periods (January to June, and July to December). 74 Those reports
must update information found in registration statements and, in addition, provide for
each general issue area in which the registrant conducted lobbying activities for the
client during the semiannual period: 1) the specific issues as to which lobbyistemployee(s) engaged in lobbying activities; 2) identification of the House(s) of
Congress and federal agencies contacted by those lobbyists; 3) the names of the persons
who were active as lobbyists during the period; 4) a description of the "interest," if any,
of foreign entities identified in the registration statement with regard to specific issues
that were lobbied; and 5) a good faith estimate of income eamed by a lobbying firm or
expenditures incurred by a self-lobbying organization during the six month period
related to lobbying activities. 75 A lobbying firm's income figures must include
payments to it by persons other than the client for the lobbying activities on behalf of
the client, 76 which would include payments in any amount coming from members of an
association or coalition that is deemed to be the client (though the name(s) of the
member(s) would have to be disclosed only if they meet the test for an affiliated
organization or for a foreign entity that must be disclosed). In the case of a selflobbying organization, its expense figures must include amounts paid to others for
77
Because the LDA definition
lobbying on its behalf (e.g. fees paid to lobbying firms).

of "lobbying activities" does not include grassroots efforts, those expenditures would
self-lobbying organization or other entities on its behalf
not include those made by the
78
to "stimulate" the grassroots.
For those taxable business and trade associations that may not deduct lobbying
expenses and those public charities whose lobbying efforts are limited by the IRC, such
self-lobbying organizations may opt to employ the applicable IRC definitions of
lobbying in providing the lobbying expense information on Form LD-2. But, for all
other information requests on that form, these same entities must employ LDA
definitions of "lobbying contact" and "lobbying activities" with regard to congressional
lobbying, and IRC definitions with respect to federal executive branch lobbying. 79 One
of the effects of this partial substitution is to avoid the possibility of specific disclosure
of grassroots legislative lobbying efforts (which are included in the IRC definitions)
beyond their being lumped together with other lobbying expenses for expenditure
disclosure purposes.
73. Id. § 1603(b).

74. Id. § 1604(a).
75. Id. § 1604(b).
76. Id. § 1604(b)(3). See William V. Luneburg & A.L. Spitzer, Registration, Reporting, and Related
Requirements, THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note *, at 110.
77. Id. § 1604(b).
78. There is one exception to this, however. Businesses and certain tax-exempt entities exercising the
option to use IRC definitions to calculate expenditure levels would have to include grassroots expenses in
their aggregated totals. See generally text infra following note 79 and text infra note 92.
79. 2 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (2000).
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The statute assigns to the Clerk and Secretary the responsibilities of: 1) providing
"guidance and assistance" for compliance with the LDA; 2) developing "common
standards, rules, and procedures for compliance;" 80 3) reviewing filed forms and, if
necessary, "verifying" and "inquiring" to determine "the accuracy, completeness and
timeliness of registration and reports;"'8 1 4) developing methods, including
computerized systems, to minimize the burden of filing and making information
contained in the registration and reports publicly available and easily accessible; and 5)
notifying lobbyists of their noncompliance with the Act and, if no "appropriate
response" is received within sixty days, notifying the United States Attorney for the
82
District of Columbia.
The authority to prosecute violations of the LDA is vested solely in the United
States Attorney for the District of Columbia. 83 No criminal penalties are provided; only
civil penalties of up to $50,000 per violation apply, and those are limited to "knowing"
84
violations of the LDA.

IV. NECESSARY

INGREDIENTS FOR

LDA REFORM

LDA reform efforts should focus on three general areas: 1) increasing the amount
of usable information collected; 2) augmenting the ability to detect violations and
undertake and publicize enforcement actions; and; 3) finally, improving the mechanism
for making information collected in registration statements and periodic reports readily
available and useful to the public and press.
A. Increasingthe Amount of Useable Information
A variety of changes fall in the category of increasing the quantity of useful data
provided by the LDA. Some of them are simple to implement, while others involve
constitutional issues or significant policy debate. The changes certain to provoke more
resistance include: 1) expanding disclosure to include information on grassroots
lobbying and the lobbyist/candidate/decisionmaker linkage; 2) mandating more specific
disclosure with regard to lobbying coalition membership, entities contacted by
lobbyists, and the basic nature of lobbying fee arrangements; and 3) eliminating the
ability to use IRC definitions of lobbying for LDA registration and reporting purposes.
On the other hand, simply rearranging how information is provided on the semiannual

80. One of the alleged failures of the FRLA was the lack of administrative guidance to assist entities
seeking to determine whether to register and what to report. The Secretary and Clerk have the authority to
issue such guidance and have, to date, issued four generally applicable guidance documents (including one in
1998 that consolidated the interpretations and advice of the first three guidance documents). The 1998
guidance is available at, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/lobby-disc briefing.htm. The
Secretary and Clerk have taken the position, however, that they lack the authority to issue legally binding
guidance and regulations.
81. The Secretary and Clerk do not have either subpoena power or general audit or investigative
authority that could assist in determining if filings are accurate and whether someone who is not registered
should register. See 2 U.S.C. § 1607(c). In fact, the LDA does not require that registrants or anyone else
maintain files that could be investigated for determining whether filings are correct or registration necessary.
82. 2 U.S.C. § 1605 (2000).
83. Id. § 1605(8).
84. Id. § 1606.
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report forms and requiring a consolidated filing by those self-lobbying organizations
that also hire lobbying firms would insure that currently required disclosures shed more
light on lobbying campaigns.
1. Disclosure of Grassroots Lobbying
Grassroots efforts are crucial elements of today's lobbying strategies. Given the
lack of mandated disclosure, however, estimates with regard to the amount of grassroots
lobbying have to be gleaned from other sources. For example, a study by the Annenberg
Public Policy Center with respect to issue advocacy during various election cycles
concluded that $135-150 million was spent during the 1996 cycle, $250-341
million
85
during the 1997-98 cycle, and over $500 million during the 1999-2000 cycle.
In Harriss, the Supreme Court implied that lobbying disclosure presented
constitutional difficulties if it applied to attempts to "propagandize the general
public." 86 At the same time, however, the Court construed the FRLA of 1946 to apply
to "artificially stimulated letter campaign[s]." ' 87 While in this manner suggesting that
public "education" programs might be off-limits in terms of disclosure requirements,
the Court thus indicated that disclosure of grassroots efforts is acceptable in certain
circumstances.
The focus of disclosure of grassroots lobbying should not be the communications
generated from members of the public. Rather, legislative disclosure mandates should
be directed at the efforts of paid professionals to create that response in support of
requests for legislative or executive branch action. That is to say, if an individual or
firm is paid significant amounts of money to stimulate the grassroots for its client's
interests or, alternatively, if an organization spends significant amounts of money for
grassroots work in support of its own legislative or administrative agenda, then
reporting of basic information related to those efforts should be mandated.
When a lobbying firm or organization that lobbies on its own behalf earns or
expends money for a grassroots effort, it is usually attempting to create leverage in
support of its direct lobbying contacts with Congress or the executive branch. In other
words, it is attempting "indirectly" to accomplish what it cannot alone achieve by its
one-on-one communications with covered officials. Disclosure focused on these
grassroot efforts serve the informational interests found sufficient by the Supreme Court
to support lobbying and campaign contribution disclosure, even if the anticorruption
rationale often invoked to justify such disclosure may not be implicated. 88 In light of
the highly publicized grassroots lobbying abuses implicated in Jack Abramoff's

85. See ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, ISSUE ADVERTISING IN THE 1999-2000 ELECTION CYCLE 1
(2001), available at http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/03-political-communication/issueads/2001
1999-2000issueadvocacy.pdf.
86. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620-21(1954).
87. Id. at 620.
88. For a recent argument that grassroots disclosure is inappropriate or unconstitutional as an
abridgement of the right to speak anonymously, see STEPHEN M. HOERSTING & BRADLEY A. SMITH, CTR. FOR
COMPETITIVE POLITICS, GRASSROOTS LOBBYING PROPOSALS SEEM NOT TO FURTHER CONGRESS' INTEREST
IN CORRECTING LOBBYING ABUSES 1 (2006),
available at http://www.campaignfreedom.org/docLib/
20060607_PolicyPrimer.pdf.
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opposition to a Texas casino, 89 the anticorruption rationale may also be satisfied.
With regard to a statutory definition of covered grassroots lobbying, First
Amendment concerns would appear to be at their peak, as Harriss suggested, where the
efforts attempt simply to create a general public "attitude" in favor of certain policies
without mentioning what those policies are or should be, or what actions should be
Arguably, therefore, the more
taken in terms of contacting federal officials.
"specifically directed" a campaign is, the less stringent are the First Amendment limits
on disclosure obligations. For instance, the campaign may be directed at specific
individuals, with regard to an identified legislative or administrative proposal, and with
an express request that the contacted individuals communicate their support or
opposition to responsible officials. If the specific focus of a grassroots campaign is
crucial to avoid serious First Amendment problems, then door-to-door or telephone
canvassing and internet campaigns easily fall within the ambit of permissible disclosure
requirements.
Should an exception from disclosure apply to grassroots efforts directed at an
entity's own members, employees, or shareholders? 90 Based on current case law, First
Amendment concerns do not militate for such an exception. After all, the focus of
concern of the Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama was to protect the ability of the
individual members to express their views anonymously via the associational format.
What was not involved was the ability of the association as an entity to express its
views to its members who would, in turn, individually express their views to federal
officials and, thereby, subject themselves to the possible intimidation from which the
associational format was supposed to protect them. In that regard, it should be noted
that the effectiveness of a grassroots campaign is dependent on the ability of the
legislative or executive branch official to know that there is a real person who wrote the
letter or e-mail (as opposed to a machine somewhere generating fictitious irate
comments). The anonymity of the responder to a grassroots solicitation is not sought,
or desired, by the persons in charge of these lobbying campaigns. Moreover, as noted
above, 9 1 the scope of protection of associational privacy afforded by NAACP v.
Alabama is subject to significant limitations in the face of the governmental interests
served by public disclosure. Indeed, the failure to extend disclosure to grassroots efforts
directed at an entity's own members, employees, or shareholders would eliminate
disclosure with regard to what are likely to be the most effective of grassroots
campaigns-those where the persons contacted have a significant interest in responding
to the request that they communicate with Congress or the executive branch.
If some disclosure of grassroots campaigns is required, what level of income earned
for conducting them or money spent to finance them should trigger registration and
disclosure on periodic reports? There is no suggestion in Harriss that a particular
expenditure amount is necessary to trigger coverage of a "stimulated letter campaign."
Setting the trigger somewhere in the range of $25,000-$50,000 in income earned or
expenses incurred will capture the most significant grassroots efforts. In all events,

89. Josephine Hearn, The AbramoffProbe Could Spur Reforms, THE HILL, Nov. 24, 2004, available at
http://www.hillnews.com/thehill/export/TheHill/Business/112404-probe.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2006).
90. S. 2349, 109th Cong. § 220(a) (as passed by Senate, March 29, 2006).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57. See also infra note 113.
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when registration is required, the amounts of income from and expenses for grassroots
work should be identified in filed reports separate from other income earned or
expenses incurred.
We note that organizations that opt under Section 15 of the LDA to use IRC
definitions of lobbying for determining their LDA registration and reporting obligations
must already keep records of their grassroots lobbying efforts and report the expense
figures (though aggregated with non-grassroots expenses). 92 For at least these entities,
the recordkeeping burdens flowing from this proposal will not increase significantly.
Under the LDA as it stands now, periodic reporting of lobbying activities by
registrants also requires a listing of the general issue area(s) and specific issues within
those area(s) lobbied, the names of the persons in charge of the lobbying, the Houses of
Congress and federal agencies contacted, and the interest(s) of foreign entities having
certain relationships to the LDA registrant in the issues lobbied. In view of the basic
nature of these disclosures, extending those requirements to grassroots efforts would not
create constitutional problems or impose reporting burdens different in kind from those
that exist under current law.
2. Disclosure of the Lobbyist/Candidate/Decisonmaker Linkage
94
93
As studies have shown, the reciprocity "rule" is pervasive in human culture:
"we should try to repay, in kind, what another person has provided us." 95 Despite their
denials to the contrary, politicians are no less subject to its sovereignty than the rest of
us.96 Gifts to Members of Congress or executive branch officials, contributions to
(re)election campaigns, service as fundraisers for those campaigns, and payment or
reimbursement of travel expenses-to name a few of the favors lobbyists or LDA
registrants may bestow-all have a tendency to increase access for the lobbyists or
favorable consideration for legislative or executive action sought by them. This is
clearly true even where the quid pro quo necessary to violate the criminal laws is not
97
present.
Where these favors are not now or in the future prohibited by statute or
congressional rule, the case for requiring disclosure is overwhelming in light of the
purposes of the LDA. The real problem is a practical one: crafting statutory provisions
that call for information sufficient to describe the basic nature of the lobbyist/lawmaker
relationship without requiring details of marginal relevance. For example, it is one
thing to mandate disclosure of the dollar amount of travel expenses reimbursed at the
behest of an LDA registrant; it is quite another matter to require a description of "all

92. Indeed, businesses and nonprofit entities must keep track of grassroots expenditures for IRC purposes
regardless of any registration or reporting obligations under the LDA.
93. See, e.g., Dennis T. Regan, Effects of a Favor and Liking on Compliance, 7 J.EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 627 (1971).

94. ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE/SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 20 (4th ed. 2001).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 26-27.
97. See Jeffrey Birnbaum, The End of Legal Bribery, WASH. MONTHLY, June 2006, available at
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2006/0606.bimbaum.html (noting the hazy line between an
illegal bribe and a lawful campaign contribution).
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meetings, tours, events, and outings attended" 98 during the trip. At a minimum, the LD2 should require disclosure of campaign contributions made, fundraising events
sponsored, and travel expenses or other significant amounts of money paid or disbursed
(or arranged to be disbursed) to or for Members by a registrant or its lobbyists.
3. Broadened Disclosure of Membership in Lobbying Coalitions
Public information regarding the funding and nature of coalition lobbying is
minimal-and sometimes misleading, as is the case when a coalition's name belies its
true purposes. For example, one group, the "Section 877 Coalition," focused its efforts
on keeping Congress from tightening a section of the IRC applying to the estates of
wealthy individuals who give up their American citizenship. The coalition paid more
than $760,000 to two firms in 2000-2001 for their lobbying efforts. As it turns out, it
was made up of trusts for members of the family of Ted Arison, founder of Carnival
99
Cruise Lines, who renounced his citizenship and returned to Israel before his death.
Lobbying forms filed under the LDA gave no hint of the identity of the coalition
100
members, though allegedly those forms fully complied with disclosure requirements.
It was the perceived need to reveal who is really behind lobbying efforts that
prompted Senator Ted Stevens, during debates leading to the LDA's enactment, to
propose a disclosure threshold for coalition members of $500 contributed semiannually
1° 1
without any further trigger, such as the need for control of the lobbying campaign.
With regard to control requirements, he acknowledged what is clearly the reality of
coalition lobbying: "The [contributor] is not going to be fooling around with
supervising and controlling lobbying activity. He wants the client to do that. They are
going to put up the money. They want the results. They are not going to manage the
activity."' 1 2 This very practical insight is a compelling reason for eliminating as a
condition for disclosure of a coalition member the existing statutory requirement that
the member plan, supervise or control the lobbying activities 10 3 of the coalition.
Clearly, the associational privacy interests protected by NAACP v. Alabama are
implicated in disclosure of coalition members. However, the Supreme Court's
limitation of that case to instances where the threat of harassment is real and not
hypothetical 104 means that asserted impingements on privacy can be raised in as-applied
challenges to an amended LDA. 10 5 There is no question that broadened coalition
membership disclosure serves the purposes identified by Harriss, Buckley, and
98. See, e.g., S. 2128, 109th Cong. § 106 (2006).
99. See, e.g., Alison Mitchell, Loophole Lets Lobbyists Hide Clients' Identity, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2002,

at A2.
100. Id.
101. 139 CONG. REc. S5561 (May 6, 1993).
102. Id. S5564.
103. See supra text accompanying note 71.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57. The threat of harassment bulked large in the McIntyre
case, suggesting that the protection of anonymous speech at issue there is a limited one.
105. See Elizabeth Garrett, Ronald M. Levin, & Theodore Ruger, ConstitutionalIssues Raisedby the 1995
Lobbying Disclosure Act, THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note *, at 150-52. Indeed, the LDA expressly
provides that "[n]othing in this [Act] shall be construed to prohibit or interfere with--(I) the right to petition
the Government for the redress of grievances; (2) the right to express a personal opinion; or (3) the right of
association, protected by the first amendment to the Constitution." 2 U.S.C. § 1607(a) (2000).

Journalof Legislation

[Vol. 33:1

McConnell to justify disclosure in the lobbying and campaign finance contexts:
providing the public and Congress with information allowing them more accurately to
identify persons whose interests may be at stake and deterring corruption and overly
compliant responses to those interests by officeholders.
With regard to the monetary threshold for disclosure of a coalition member,
reducing the threshold from the current $10,000 per semiannual period to as low as
$100 would appear to be consistent with, for example, the Supreme Court's decision in
Buckley, which upheld disclosure of annual political contributions at that level.l°6 But,
as Senator Levin pointed out in 1993 in objecting to Senator Stevens' proposed $500
threshold, disclosure of such small amounts in the lobbying context produces
information of marginal, if any, value for anyone. 10 7 At the time he spoke, the
proposed contribution limit in Senator Levin's bill was $5,000 for a semiannual period.
That amount in fact conforms better than the current $10,000 threshold to what most
members of the public would likely consider a significant investment deserving
disclosure. Moreover, except where the likelihood of harassment or other adverse
effects can be demonstrated, there should be no distinction between individuals and
artificial entities; disclosure should apply to both types of coalition member.
Strategies to avoid disclosure of coalition membership must be anticipated and
countered through congressional formulation of "look-through" rules. For example, a
coalition of five members might funnel hundreds of thousands of dollars to a third party
that would hire a lobbyist to work purportedly on its own behalf, but effectively to
advance the interests of the coalition. Under the LDA as currently written, the third
party would be considered the client, which would have to be disclosed, and the
coalition itself (but not its individual members) would be considered an "affiliated
organization"' 108 whose formal name would have to be disclosed if it met the existing
"control" requirement. Alternatively, coalitions can be created of still other coalitions
like Russian matryoshka dolls, with the result that only the names of contributing
coalitions would be disclosed, and not the individual members contributing the requisite
amount to a lobbying campaign. Disclosure requirements must penetrate the potential
lobbying shields.
Finally, various lobbying reform bills introduced during the 109th Congress
specified that associations qualifying for tax exempt treatment under the Internal
Revenue Code would not be subject to even the modestly broadened coalition
disclosure that they proposed. 10 9 We disagree. The wisdom of such provisions is
questionable in light of congressional investigations of the activities of Jack Abramoff,
which identified the blatant misuse of tax-exempt entities as "pass-throughs" to
distribute money for lobbying and other purposes.°10 If qualification as a tax-exempt
entity offered protection from disclosure, coalitions might seek that status for purposes

106. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 82-84 (1976).
107. 139 CONG. REC. S5563 (May 6, 1993).
108. 2 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3) (2000) (requires disclosure of the contributing "organization"). See also id. §
1602(13), (14) (2000).
109. See, e.g., S. 1398, 109th Cong. § 107(a) (2006); S.2128, 109th Cong. § 108(a) (2006); H.R. 4575,
109th Cong. § 108(a) (2006).
110. See, e.g., Susan Schmidt & James V. Grimaldi, Nonprofit Groups Funneled Money for Abramoff,
WASH. POST, June 25, 2006, at A].

2006]

Lobbying Disclosure:A Recipe for Reform

that have nothing to do with the reasons tax-exempt treatment is made available in the
first place.
4. Requiring More Specific Identification of the Target(s) of Lobbying
Currently, periodic reports must merely indicate which House of Congress or
federal agency was contacted by a lobbyist. Earlier versions of the bill enacted as the
LDA required the names of congressional committees contacted, but rejected specific
identification of persons contacted based, in part, on the following rationale:
... a requirement to disclose the specific identity of federal officials with whom a
lobbyist has met could have a chilling impact on free speech and infringe on protected
first amendment rights in at least two ways. First, some government officials might
refrain from engaging in communications with certain individuals or groups for fear of
being linked with them, thereby restricting the access of citizens to their government
officials. Second, such a requirement may reveal an organization's lobbying strategy
and political associations, which could, in some cases, violate the first amendment right
of free association. 111
One entirely reasonable reaction to these feared consequences would be that they
are exactly what effective lobbying disclosure is supposed to produce; otherwise
adequate deterrence of inappropriate behavior will not occur. The constitutional
concerns are overstated. There may be a right of citizens to speak their minds to or
about government; but there is no corresponding constitutional obligation on the part of
federal officials to make themselves available to listen or to speak back. The
constitutional right to petition is not as demanding as the Administrative Procedure
Act's right to petition for agency action.1l 2 Secondly, there may be constitutional
protection in some circumstances from disclosure of information related to the internal
affairs of an association, but there is none with regard to the association's external
political linkages or the strategies it employs to achieve its purposes. The burdens of
disclosing the names of officials contacted provide the more convincing objection; they
were also relied upon in drafting the LDA. 113 Meetings or other lobbying contacts are
likely to be frequent and often involve numerous officials, some whose covered status
may be unclear. The resulting reports would be mountainous. There may also be
unintended political consequences caused by gaming of the lobbying process (where,
for example, lobbyists representing an unpopular cause loudly report frequent contacts
with an unsympathetic Member).

11l. S.REP. No. 103-37, at 35 (1993). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the administrative costs
of disclosure may deter advocacy and present First Amendment issues. See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 254-55 (1986).
112. See William V. Luneburg, Petitioning Federal Agencies for Rulemaking: An Overview of
Administrative and Judicial Practice and Some Recommendations for Improvement, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 1, 6
(1988). While "privacy" may in some instances optimize freedom of speech, see William V. Luneburg, Civic
Republicanism, supra note 48, at 382-89, the public interests represented by lobbying disclosure can justify
congressional restrictions on that privacy.
113. S.REP. NO. 103-37, at 35 (1993).
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What is reasonable and potentially helpful is identification of congressional
committee(s), subcommittees, and the office(s) within federal agencies contacted by
lobbyists employed by the registrant. Even identification of a Member's office might be
mandated, without any indication whether staff or the Member was contacted or how
often. This information would be useful, with a reasonable burden on the lobbyist and
low risk to the lobbying process.
5. Disclosure of the Basis for Compensation Paid to Lobbying Firms
As it stands now, all the LDA requires in terms of income reporting by lobbying
firms is the amount earned during a semiannual period. 114 While contingent fees are
unlawful in certain contexts (e.g. the Foreign Agents Registration Act115 ), there is no
general state or federal ban on such compensation arrangements 116 and indeed some
federal lobbing is conducted on that basis. However, there is an increased potential for
corrupting the lobbying process through the temptations created where a lobbyist is paid
only if successful in his or her representation, based on a percentage of what is
achieved, or with a "bonus" for success. The best way to address this is through
disclosure: the LD-2 should require disclosure of the existence and nature of any
contingent fee arrangement, as well as whether and how much reported income was
paid or payable on that basis.
6. Elimination of the Section 15 Option to Utilize IRC Definitions
In a nutshell, the option to use IRC definitions permits purposeful avoidance of
disclosure or results in disclosure that may be seriously misleading, 117 thereby defeating
the purposes of the LDA. A few examples will suffice.
Organization "A" is a public charity that invokes the Section 15 option to use IRC
definitions. All of its lobbying is directed to high-level federal executive branch
officials relating to administrative regulations and costs over $600,000 annually. Under
LDA definitions, the $24,500 threshold for registration is easily satisfied. But, since the
applicable IRC definition of lobbying does not include lobbying executive branch
officials on nonlegislative subject matters, 118 "A" will not incur any expenditures
triggering registration. Moreover, even if "A" did sufficient lobbying on legislative
matters so that one of its employees qualified as a lobbyist 119 and the monetary
threshold for registration was satisfied, its semiannual report would still not provide any
disclosure with regard to its significant administrative lobbying. Persons reading its
report would have a seriously mistaken sense of its lobbying efforts.
The IRC definitions that preclude a business deduction for lobbying expenditures
114. 2 U.S.C. §1604(b)(3) (2000).
115. 22 U.S.C. §618(h) (2000).
116. See Thomas M. Susman and Margaret Martin, Contingent Fee Lobbying, Chapter 20, THE LOBBYING
MANUAL, supra note *, at 342.
117. For a detailed examination of this problem, see GAO STUDY, supra note 70.
118. Id. at 32.
119. For a non-profit making the Section 15 election, it would use IRC definitions for lobbying executive
branch officials, but LDA definitions for lobbying legislative branch officials in determining whether its
employee was a lobbyist for registration purposes. See 2 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2).
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include state level lobbying, which is not covered by the LDA. Company "B," relying
on its Section 15 option, reports semiannual lobbying expenditures of $500,000,
$440,000 of which was for lobbying the Michigan legislature and $60,000 for lobbying
federal executive and legislative officials on auto safety issues. Assume "B" must
register regardless of which lobbying definitions apply. 120 The $500,000 will be
reported in one lump sum on the semiannual report it must file. Another registrant
("C"), an entity either not entitled to invoke Section 15 or one that has chosen not to
elect to use it, reports expenses of $200,000 for federal-level lobbying on the same
issues. The semiannual reports for these entities will convey the impression that "B"
spent 121much more on federal level lobbying than "C" when, in fact, that was not the
case.
Moreover, since reporting of the lobbying activities of"B" other than expenses
for the semiannual period will not include state level lobbying, persons examining the
LD-2 may improperly infer that "B" spent $500,000 on those activities that are
disclosed. In other words, the Section 15 election can result in organizations reporting
expenses that simply do not correspond to other information that is provided.
These effects of the Section 15 option to use IRC definitions would be problematic
even if there were some assurance that it would only be invoked where the registrant (or
prospective registrant) believed that creating two different sets of records, one for LDA
purposes and the other for the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), was unduly
burdensome for it. Avoiding that burden was the rationale underlying Section 15.122
But it is unlikely-indeed it is a virtual certainty-that many entities eligible for the
election rely on it for strategic purposes, that is, to eliminate or minimize disclosure of
lobbying efforts or even to create misimpressions of the nature of lobbying campaigns.
The Act does not prohibit strategic invocation of the option, though such behavior
significantly undercuts the statute's purposes.
Moreover, even if a business or public charity does not make a Section 15 election
for the purpose of avoiding disclosure, but simply to avoid duplicate record-keeping,
duplicate recordkeeping may still be necessary. Because of a 1998 technical
amendment to the LDA, in determining whether a particular employee is a lobbyist for
registration purposes and, if registration is required, in providing information with
regard to the entity's lobbying efforts, the registrant or potential registrant must use
LDA definitions for lobbying legislative branch officials. 123 Accordingly, for example,
an electing entity must track the time devoted to lobbying legislative branch officials on
both legislative and administrative subjects in order to determine whether their
employee(s) meet the LDA's twenty percent-of-time threshold necessary to qualify as a
lobbyist. Simultaneously, it will have to track legislative contact time and associated
expenses using IRC definitions, which do not include communications relating to
120. As in the case of public charities, see source cited supra note 119, for some purposes LDA
definitions apply even to businesses making the Section 15 election.
121. This example raises, in part, the question why an entity (like "B") would opt for IRC definitions
when, one might assume, it would prefer to give the impression of limited lobbying work. However, in the
case presented, since the IRC coverage of federal administrative officials who can be lobbied is much smaller
than those defined by the LDA as covered officials, the IRC definitions may lead to nondisclosure of
information that the reporting entity may wish to hide, like the names of lobbyists and agencies contacted on

administrative matters.
122. See supra text following note 67.
123. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1610(a)(2)(A), (b)(2)(A) (2000).
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nonlegislative subjects (e.g. administrative rules) for the purpose of determining
whether the monetary threshold for registration is met and what lobbying expenses to
report for LDA and IRC purposes.
While it is impossible to know how many entities rely on Section 15 to avoid
registration, a 1999 GAO study indicated that only twenty-nine percent of the registered
.. 124
organizations eligible for the election used IRC definitions for expense reporting.
If
reliance on Section 15 is uncommon, the case for retaining it is weak. On the other
hand, if the option is frequently invoked, the argument for eliminating it is even
stronger given its basic inconsistency with the disclosure purposes of the LDA.
7. Requiring Closer Linkage Between the Names of Active Lobbyists, Specific Issues
Lobbied, and the Entity/Official Contacted
As it is currently drafted, the LDA requires semiannual reports to provide
125
information regarding lobbying campaigns organized on a general topic basis.
Accordingly, reports do not link a specific issue with the entity contacted or, for that
matter, the lobbyist who made the contact. Thus, for example, under the general topic
area "Environmental/Superfund," two specific issues might be listed, for example,
"EPA new source review regulations under the Clean Air Act" and "wetland protection
under Section 404 Clean Water Act," with the Senate and EPA identified as having
been contacted. The listing of active lobbyists during the semiannual period may
include Lobbyists "A", "B", and "C." There is no way to know, however, which
lobbyist(s) contacted EPA on which of the issues listed. The unfocused nature of the
information provided significantly undercuts the ability of the Act to deter inappropriate
behavior.
Accordingly, the LDA should be amended to require that, instead of a listing by
general area topic, information on lobbying activities during a reporting period be
arranged by the name of each lobbyist active during the period covered. For each
specific issue lobbied by a listed lobbyist, the contacted entity should be disclosed.
8. Consolidated Semiannual Reports for Self-Lobbying Organizations that Hire
Lobbying Firms
It is often the case that the same client will both hire a lobbying firm and also use
its own employees to conduct lobbying campaigns on its behalf. In that event,
assuming the firm and the self-lobbying organization meet the requirements for LDA
coverage, two registrations will be on file for the same client. More importantly,
persons interested in obtaining a complete picture of the lobbying activities for the
client must examine all of the semiannual reports that relate to it for a particular
reporting period. While such a search is possible today with the Senate's webaccessible database, such additional investigation should not be required.
Moreover, when undertaken today, such a search results in information that may be

124. See GAO STUDY, supra note 70, at 18.
indicate whether this percentage has changed.
125. See 2 U.S.C. § 1604(b)(2) (2000).

There has been no other published study since 1999 to
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misleading. The LDA requires that a self-lobbying organization semiannually report
fees paid to third parties for conducting lobbying activities on its behalf. 126 Those third
parties include lobbying firms, whether or not they are required to register under the
Act.127 As it turns out, many self-lobbying organizations have filed semiannual reports
without including such fees. 128 Unfortunately, even if both the self-lobbying
organization and its retained lobbying firm(s) comply with the reporting requirements
as they currently exist, persons reviewing the LD-2's for the same client are likely
mistakenly to double-count expenses to the extent they add the fees reported by the
lobbying firm(s) to the total expenses reported by the self-lobbying entity. Requiring a
consolidated semiannual report to be filed jointly by a registered self-lobbying
organization and its retained registered lobbying firm(s) would eliminate both the
mandated duplicate reporting of lobbying expenses and any related confusion.
Since the self-lobbying organization's expense totals must include amounts paid to
lobbying firms for lobbying activities on its behalf, logically it makes sense that the LD2 include the names of all lobbyists who were active on behalf of the client-organization
during the reporting period, whether or not as its employees. Unfortunately, in calling
for the names of lobbyists on both registration statements and semiannual reports, the
LDA limits the listing to a registrant's "employee[s]," a term that does not include
"independent contractors" ' 129 such as lobbying firms. A consolidated filing for a client
130
A
would, therefore, result in a listing of all of the lobbyists working for the client.
consolidated filing would also require the retained lobbying firm(s) and its client
organization to agree on a common description of the specific issues lobbied for LD-2
purposes and thus avoid the confusion that might otherwise result from different issue
descriptions in different reports filed for the same client.
B. Improving the Ability and Willingness to Enforce the LDA
The FRLA of 1946 was remarkable, among other things, for the lack of
enforcement by the Department of Justice. 13 1 Shifting to civil, as opposed to criminal,
penalties in the LDA was motivated in part by a desire to increase enforcement
activities. 132 However, vigorous enforcement has not been realized. The problem is
rooted in the lack of resources, interest, and legal authority.
The Secretary and Clerk's offices have a handful of employees whose duties
include not only LDA compliance oversight but general administration, and they
receive approximately 100,000 LDA forms a year. Violations appear to be reasonably

126. See supra text accompanying note 77.
127. See William V. Luneburg and A.L. Spitzer, Registration, Reporting, and Related Requirements,
supra note 76, at 110.
128. See

THE

CENTER

FOR

PUBLIC

INTEGRITY/LOBBYWATCH,

Methodology,

http://www.publicintegrity.org/lobby/default.aspx?act=methodology (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
129. 2 U.S.C. § 1602(5)(A) (2000).
130. See text supra following note 125, proposing that required periodic reports organize information
organized by lobbyist's names.
131. See Statement of Milton J. Socolar, Special Assistant to the Comptroller General, Before the
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States
Senate, FederalRegulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 is Ineffective, GAO/T-GGD-91-56, at 2 (1991).
132. See S. REP. No. 103-37, at 36-37 (1993).
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frequent, for instance, late filing and failure to supply required information. 133 Where
an apparent violation is discovered, a letter is sent to the registrant, identifying the
defect(s) and requesting correction. If an "appropriate response" is not received to the
letter, the offices must refer the cases to the United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia. Indeed, since 2003, the Secretary's office has allegedly referred over 2,000
such cases. 134 However, DOJ claims to have received only 200. In three cases, DOJ
entered into settlements, with penalties amounting to $47,000 and a three-year ban on
lobbying by one unnamed lobbyist. 135 Basic information regarding DOJ's enforcement
became publicly available for the first time in 2005 only because of a Freedom of
136
Information Act request that DOJ initially resisted on the basis of the Privacy Act.
While the Secretary and Clerk could be given more resources for compliance
oversight, as part of Congress they are unlikely ever to have adequate incentive to
become aggressive in light of potential embarrassments that might be suffered by
Members themselves. More importantly, Congress cannot give the Secretary and Clerk
(or any other entity deemed to be part of Congress) more legal authority to police the
LDA because of basic separation-of-powers principles. 13 7 DOJ's anemic and less-thantransparent record to date with regard LDA enforcement suggests, moreover, that
reliance on DOJ alone is possibly misplaced.
During the process of the LDA's development, it was proposed at one point that
policing lobbying disclosure compliance be vested in the Federal Election Commission,
which oversees the related area of campaign disclosure and whose enforcement efforts
are generally publicly disclosed. 138 While that option was rejected in 1993, Congress
should revisit it. This approach could result in an administrative civil penalty procedure
139
that avoids, in the first instance, the need for DOJ involvement.
C. Improving Public Availability of Lobbying Information
As noted above, the LDA mandates that the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of
the House develop "computerized systems designed to minimize the burden of filing
and maximize public access to materials filed under" the Act. 14 While the Senate's
Office of Public Records (SOPR) has permitted and encouraged, but not required,
Internet filing of registrations and reports for several years and maintains an Internet-

133. See THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY/LOBBY WATCH, Industry of Influence Nets Almost $13
Billion, http://www.publicintegrity.org/lobby/default.aspx?act+summary (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
134. See Senate Passed 2, 000 Possible LDA Violations to DOJ,Dodd Reports, BNA REG. & LAW No. 30,
at A-5 (February 14, 2006).
135. See Justice Department Reveals First Cases Settled Under Lobbying Disclosure Statute, BNA REG.
& LAW/DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES No. 157, Aug. 16, 2005 at A-18.
136. See DOJ Refuses to Disclose Settlements With Those Who Violate Lobbying Law, BNA REG. & LAW,
No. 117 (June 20, 2005) at A-12.
137. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986); Metropolitan
Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
138. See, e.g., DOJ Refuses to Disclose Settlements With Those Who Violate Lobbying Law supra note
135, at A-13.
139. The FEC currently has authority to assess civil penalties.
See, e.g., FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION,
How
the
Administrative
Fine
Program
Works,
available
at
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/admin-fines.shtml (last visited Dec. 15, 2006).
140. Id. § 1605(3)(B) (2000).

2006]

Lobbying Disclosure:A Recipefor Reform

accessible database of those forms, it was not until 2006 that the Clerk's Legislative
Resource Center (HLRC) entered the electronic age when it mandated Internet filing,
though via a different system than used by the SOPR. 14 Unfortunately, the debut of
HLRC's system was marred by glitches that created difficulties for many registrants in
meeting the February 2006 filing deadline. Moreover, as of December 2006, there was
still no Internet- accessible lobbying database maintained by the Clerk, and the usability
of the Senate's database was restricted by the lack of full-text search capability. Also,
the search categories made available by the Secretary are limited, omitting significant
parameters such as specific issues lobbied. 142 Indeed, manual data entry is a significant
resource commitment for the Secretary. Given the lack of staff, the Senate's lobbying
database is months behind in the filings that it reflects. Compounding all of these
difficulties is the fact that filings are often late. A recent study suggested that 36,000
(or almost 20 percent) of lobbying forms were filed at least three months after the
deadline and 3,000 forms were filed six months late, while 1,700 were filed at least a
143
year late.
If electronic filing of both registrations and reports were required with both the
Clerk and Secretary in a shared system that permitted immediate posting on the Internet
and full-text searches as well as searches by category of information called for by the
required forms, there would be a significant reduction in the delays that are currently
encountered in gaining access to lobbying data. Indeed, under those circumstances, latefiling would inevitably be reduced. When Congress is in session, six months can be a
lifetime for important legislation. Although bills addressing many issues appear to
remain on the legislative calendar for years or even decades (tort and bankruptcy reform
have in the past suffered that fate), Congress may become energized to act in a matter of
weeks. Significant lag-time in making lobbying data available to those who are
interested is fatal to fully carrying out the deterrent purposes of the LDA.
It is hard to believe that, more than a decade after the LDA's enactment, the current
system of limited disclosure is still in place. Not surprisingly, despite their differences
on other important matters, the 2006 Senate and House lobbying reform bills largely
agreed that this was a problem that had to be fixed. 144 Statutory amendment should be
unnecessary to effect the changes proposed above-though apparently the
unwillingness of the Secretary and Clerk to act on their own may require the
intervention of their congressional bosses.
Both the Senate and House bills also imposed a quarterly, rather than the current

141. Former House Committee Chairman Bob Ney issued a directive to the Clerk in June 2005 to require
electronic filing of LDA registrations, reports, and amendments thereto. See Rep. Bob Ney, Committee on
House Administration, Electronic Filing of Disclosure Reports (June 29, 2005), available at
www.lobbyinginfo.org/documents/NeyLetter.pdf.
142. While the semiannual report form requires the listing of "specific" issues lobbied, the exact
formulation of those is up to the registrant with minimal guidance from the Act and administrators, unlike
"general issue areas," which also have to be reported, to each of which the Secretary and Clerk have assigned
a distinctive code number which can be retrieved by the search engine currently offered by the SOPR. A
system that would permit full text searches would avoid the current inability to conduct specific issue
searches.
143. See Industry of Influence Nets Almost $13 Billion, infra note 133. The SOPR, however, disputes the
accuracy of these figures.
144. See S. 2349, 109th Cong. §§ 213, 219 (2005); H.R. 4975, 109th Cong. §§ 102, 103 (2005).
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semi-annual, reporting period 145 to further eliminate delays in making lobbying
information available. If electronic filing with both the Senate and House were
mandated and employed a common system permitting simultaneous lodging of the
required forms with both the SOPR and HLRC, the burden imposed on registrants by
146
additional filings would be significantly reduced.
V. CONCLUSION

Lobbying disclosure deserves a better chance than it has had so far to prove its
ability to deter inappropriate influences on the legislative and executive decisionmaking processes. While certain administrative changes can insure the public
availability of lobbying data and thereby assist in carrying out the purposes of the LDA,
the statute must be amended to impose a more effective disclosure scheme. Our
proposals are not revolutionary; they recognize the importance of lobbying to
responsive and effective congressional and executive decision-making, and they build
on what we believe to be the basically sound foundation of the Lobbying Disclosure
Act. Thus, even as the recent rash of scandals disappears from the front pages,
Congress should nonetheless step up to the stove and add a few new ingredients to
make lobbying disclosure a more potent and robust response to some of the important
challenges facing our body politic.

145. See S. 2349, 109th Cong. § 211 (2005); H.R. 4975, 109th Cong. § 101 (2005).
146. The requirement for obtaining authorized digital signatures for HLRC, but not SOPR, filings today
adds delay to the filing process. See generally, Thomas M. Susman, Congress's Lobbying Report Electronic
Filing Fiasco,ROLL CALL (Sept. 6, 2006).

